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Abstract
The AVR pebble bed reactor (46 MWth) was operated 1967-88 at coolant outlet temperatures
up to 990°C. A principle difference of pebble bed HTRs as AVR to conventional reactors is
the continuous movement of fuel element pebbles through the core which complicates
thermohydraulic, nuclear and safety estimations . Also because of a lack of other experience
AVR operation is still a relevant basis for future pebble bed HTRs and thus requires careful
examination. This paper deals mainly with some insufficiently published unresolved safety
problems of AVR operation and of pebble bed HTRs but skips the widely known
advantageous features of pebble bed HTRs.
The AVR primary circuit is heavily contaminated with metallic fission products (Sr-90, Cs-137)
which create problems in current dismantling . The amount of this contamination is not exactly
known, but the evaluation of fission product deposition experiments indicates that the end of
life contamination reached several percent of a single core inventory, which is some orders of
magnitude more than precalculated and far more than in large LWRs . A major fraction of this
contamination is bound on graphitic dust and thus partly mobile in depressurization
accidents, which has to be considered in safety analyses of future reactors . A re-evaluation
of the AVR contamination is performed here in order to quantify consequences for future
HTRs (400 MWth) . It leads to the conclusion that the AVR contamination was mainly caused
by inadmissible high core temperatures, increasing fission product release rates, and not - as
presumed in the past - by inadequate fuel quality only.
The high AVR core temperatures were detected not earlier than one year before final AVR
shut-down, because a pebble bed core cannot yet be equipped with instruments. The
maximum core temperatures are still unknown but were more than 200 K higher than
calculated. Further, azimuthal temperature differences at the active core margin of up to 200
K were observed, probably due to a power asymmetry. Unpredictable hot gas currents with
temperatures > 1100°C, which may have harmed the steam generator, were measured in the
top reflector range.
After detection of the inadmissible core temperatures, the AVR hot gas temperatures were
strongly reduced for safety reasons. Thus a safe and reliable AVR operation at high coolant
temperatures, which is taken as a foundation of the pebble bed VHTR development in
Generation IV, was not conform with reality. Despite of remarkable effort spent in this
problem the high core temperatures, the power asymmetry and the hot gas currents are not
yet understood. It remains uncertain whether convincing explanations can be found on basis
of the poor AVR data and whether pebble bed specific effects are acting . Respective
examinations are however ongoing . Reliable predictions of pebble bed temperatures are at
present not yet possible.
The AVR contamination problems are related to the fact that even intact HTR fuel elements
do not act as an almost complete barrier for metals, as they do for noble gases . Metals
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diffuse in fuel kernel, coatings and graphite and their break through takes place in long term
normal operation, if fission product specific temperature limits are exceeded. This is an
unresolved weak point of HTRs and is in contrast to other reactors : Intact LWR fuel elements
represent a complete barrier despite of fuel centre temperatures of up to 2500°C, because
claddings remain at temperatures < 600°C which excludes release by diffusion . Another
disadvantage of HTRs, responsible for the pronounced contamination, lies in the fact that
activity released from fuel elements is distributed in HTRs all over the coolant circuit surfaces
and on graphitic dust and accumulates there . Deposition rates of chemical reactive fission
products in the HTR coolant circuit are large . Thus the removal of activity released from core
by a coolant purging facility like in LWRs cannot be performed in gas cooled reactors.
Consequences of AVR experience on future reactors are discussed . For that, the influence of
fuel quality on the AVR contamination is examined. In contrast to Sr and Ag the retention of
Cs in intact coated particles of modern TRISO fuel, as present in AVR during its final years of
operation, is even worse compared to former HTI-BISO fuel . On the other hand the fraction
of defective fuel particles and of uranium outside particle kernels is smaller in modern fuel.
Further, the retention of Sr in oxides kernels used in modern fuel is better than in former
carbide kernels. For an AVR operation with only modern TRISO fuel the contamination is
estimated to be by a factor of 10 to 30 lower for Sr-90 . Smaller reductions are expected for
Cs and Ag. These results are not in conflict with recent high temperature irradiations of
modern fuel, which discovered significant higher activity releases than expected.
As long as pebble bed immanent reasons for high core temperatures cannot be excluded
they have to be conservatively considered in operation and design basis accidents of future
pebble beds HTRs. For that case we have to note that AVR was operated for only less than 4
y at hot gas temperatures > 900°C, and thus primary circuit contaminations in future reactors
(400 MWth, 900°C hot gas temperature, modern fuel, 32 full power years) are expected to
approach at least the same order as in AVR end of life . This creates problems: Former safety
analyses for advanced small HTRs revealed that activities accumulated in the primary circuit
are a major source term contributor in design basis accidents . Further maintenance and
dismantling is significantly hindered. Another consequence of inadmissible high core
temperatures to be considered in future reactors is the transgression of temperature limits,
which prevent from formation of explosive gas mixtures in water ingress accidents of steam
cycle and certain process heat generating designs . Ingress of liquid water into the pebble
bed, as it accidently happened in AVR, has to be excluded in future reactors by design
measures in order to avoid a potential positive void coefficient of reactivity with reactivity
transients.
Criteria for the maximum tolerable accumulated activity in the coolant circuit are developed
on basis of German regulations for protection of the public, i.e. maximum tolerable releases
in design basis accidents, and of requirements from maintenance and disposal . Application
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of these criteria on advanced pebble bed reactors leads to the conclusion that a pebble bed
HTR needs a gas tight containment even if inadmissible high temperatures as observed in
AVR are not considered. However, a gas tight containment does not diminish the
consequences of the primary circuit contamination on maintenance and dismantling.
Inadmissible high temperatures substantially aggravate these problems. A safe operation at
hot gas temperatures near to those suitable for process heat applications can currently not
be guaranteed by pebble bed reactors, even if a gas tight containment is present.
Thus complementary measures to a containment in order to achieve safe operation of pebble
bed reactors despite of activity accumulation in the primary circuit and of temperature
uncertainties are discussed. A reduction of demands on future reactors (hot gas
temperatures, fuel burn-up) is one option ; another one is an elaborate R&D program for
solution of the following problems related to operation and design basis accidents:
- development of a new fuel element sufficiently retaining metallic fission products in
long term operation. For hot gas temperatures as in process heat applications the
retention of non metallic fission products has to be improved, too
- development of a reliable quality control for fuel elements
- experiments on iodine release from fuel elements in core heat-up accidents
- full understanding and reliable modeling of core temperature behaviour and of pebble
bed mechanics including pebble rupture
- fast and reliable local measurement (direct or indirect) of safety relevant parameters
in the pebble bed core (e .g. temperatures)
- full understanding of fission product transport in the coolant circuit, including
development of measures to avoid the current uncontrollable activity accumulation in
the circuit
- development of a fast detection system for metallic fission product release from core
- material development for process heat components
- HTR specific dismantling and disposal items
A voluminously instrumented experimental pebble bed reactor would be required for solution
of these problems . Before initiation of this comprehensive R&D a feasibility study including
an estimate of the required effort is advisable in order to quantify the economical risk of this
development. Comparative probabilistic safety assessments on pebble bed HTRs, HTRs with
block type fuel and Generation III LWRs are proposed in order to generate a reliable figure of
current pebble bed reactor safety: Former safety studies for pebble bed HTRs are expected
to be too optimistic in light of improved knowledge.
III
Eine sicherheitstechnische Neubewertung des Betriebs des
AVR-Kugelhaufenreaktors und Schlussfolgerungen für zukünftige Reaktoren
Zusammenfassung
Der Kugelhaufenreaktor AVR (46 MW th) war von 1967-88 mit Kühlgasaustrittstemperaturen
bis 990°C in Betrieb. Ein grundsätzlicher Unterschied von Kugelhaufen-HTR zu
konventionellen Reaktoren liegt in der kontinuierlichen Bewegung von kugelförmigen
Brennelementen durch das Core, was thermohydraulische, nukleare und
sicherheitstechnische Berechnungen erschwert . Die Ergebnisse des AVR-Betriebs dienen
als wichtige Grundlage der Entwicklung zukünftiger Kugelhaufenreaktoren, da es nur wenig
andere belastbare Erfahrungen gibt. Daher müssen die AVR-Betriebserfahrungen sorgfältig
analysiert werden. Diese Arbeit befasst sich vorwiegend mit einigen unzureichend
veröffentlichten aber sicherheitstechnisch relevanten Problemen des AVR-Betriebes. Weithin
bekannte Vorteile von Kugelhaufenreaktoren werden nicht behandelt.
Der AVR-Kühlkreislauf ist massiv mit metallischen Spaltprodukten (Sr-90, Cs-137)
kontaminiert, was zu erheblichen Problemen beim gegenwärtigen Rückbau führt. Das
Ausmaß der Kontamination ist zwar nicht exakt bekannt, aber die Auswertung von
Spaltproduktablagerungsexperimenten lässt darauf schließen, dass diese Kontamination
zum Betriebsende einige Prozent eines Coreinventars erreichte und damit um
Größenordnungen über Vorausrechnungen und auch ganz erheblich über den
Kontaminationen in großen LWR liegt. Ein bedeutender Anteil dieser Kontamination ist an
Graphitstaub gebunden und damit in Druckentlastungsstörfällen teilweise mobil, was in
Sicherheitsbewertungen zukünftiger Reaktoren zu berücksichtigen ist . In dieser Arbeit wird
die AVR-Kontamination neu ausgewertet um Folgerungen für Projekte zukünftiger
Kugelhaufen-HTR größerer Leistung zu quantifizieren. Dabei ergab sich, dass die
Kontamination des AVR-Kühlkreislaufs nicht wie früher angenommen in erster Linie durch
unzureichende Brennelementqualitäten verursacht wurde sondern durch unzulässig hohe
Coretemperaturen, welche die Freisetzungen erheblich beschleunigten.
Die unzulässig hohen Coretemperaturen wurden erst 1 Jahr vor dem endgültigen AVR-
Betriebsende entdeckt, da ein Kugelhaufencore bisher nicht instrumentierbar ist . Die
maximalen Coretemperaturen im AVR sind zwar weiterhin unbekannt, aber sie lagen mehr
als 200 K über berechneten Werten. Außerdem wurden azimuthale Temperaturdifferenzen
am Corerand von bis zu 200 K gemessen, welche vermutlich auf eine Leistungsschieflage
zurückzuführen sind. Heißgassträhnen mit Temperaturen > 1100°C, welche den Dampf-
erzeuger geschädigt haben könnten, wurden gelegentlich oberhalb des Cores gemessen.
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Nach Entdeckung der unzulässig hohen Coretemperaturen wurden die Heißgastemperaturen
aus Sicherheitsgründen drastisch abgesenkt. Eine sicheren und zuverlässigen AVR-Betrieb
bei Prozesswärme-tauglichen Gasaustrittstemperaturen, wie er als Basis der Kugelhaufen-
VHTR-Entwicklung im Generation IV Projekt unterstellt wird, hat es daher nicht gegeben.
Obwohl erheblicher Aufwand in die Untersuchung der hohen Temperaturen, der
Heißgassträhnen und der Leistungsschieflage investiert wurde sind deren Ursachen bisher
nicht verstanden. Es bleibt unklar, ob eine eindeutige Erklärung auf der Basis der
unzureichenden AVR-Daten überhaupt gefunden werden kann und ob Kugelhaufen-
spezifische Ursachen dominieren. Entsprechende Untersuchungen werden weitergeführt.
Gegenwärtig sind zuverlässige Vorausrechnungen von Coretemperaturen im Kugelhaufen
nicht möglich.
Die AVR-Kontaminationsprobleme hängen auch damit zusammen, dass intakte HTR-
Brennelemente nicht als fast vollständige Barriere für metallische Spaltprodukte angesehen
werden können, wie sie es für Edelgase sind. Metalle diffundieren im Brennstofffkern, in den
Beschichtungen und im Graphit . Ein Durchbruch durch diese Barrieren findet im Langzeit-
Normalbetrieb statt, wenn bestimmte, Spaltprodukt-spezifische Temperaturgrenzen
überschritten werden . Hier liegt eine ungelöste Schwachstelle von HTR vor, die es bei
anderen Reaktoren nicht gibt: Intakte LWR-Brennelemente stellen eine vollständige
Spaltproduktbarriere trotz maximaler Brennstoffzentraltemperaturen von 2500°C dar, weil die
Hüllrohre unter 600°C bleiben, was eine Freisetzung durch Diffusion ausschließt . Eine
andere HTR-Schwachstelle, welche zu den AVR-Kontaminationen beigetragen hat, liegt
darin begründet, dass sich die aus den Brennelementen freigesetzten Nuklide im HTR
unkontrolliert über den gesamten Kühlkreislauf verteilen . Wegen der hohen
Ablagerungsraten von chemisch reaktiven Spaltprodukten in HTR-Kühlkreisläufen kann
nämlich die aus den Brennelementen freigesetzte Aktivität nicht über eine Reinigungsanlage
entfernt werden, wie es im LWR Standard ist.
Schlussfolgerungen aus dem AVR-Betrieb für zukünftige Kugelhaufenreaktoren werden
diskutiert. Dazu wird der Einfluss der Brennelementqualität auf die AVR-Kontamination
untersucht: Im Unterschied zu Sr und Ag ist die Cs-Rückhaltung in intakten Partikeln
moderner TRISO-Brennelemente, wie sie in den letzten Betriebsjahren im AVR vorhanden
waren, schlechter verglichen mit den anfänglich benutzten HTI-BISO Brennelementen . Bei
niedrigen Temperaturen wird das kompensiert durch die geringere Zahl defekter coated
particles in TRISO-Brennelementen. Sr wird in modernen oxidischen Brennstoffkernen
besser zurückgehalten als in den anfänglich verwendeten karbidischen Kernen . Unterstellt
man, dass der AVR-Betrieb von Anfang an mit modernem TRISO Brennstoff erfolgt wäre,
hätte sich eine um den Faktor 10 – 30 geringere Sr-Kontamination ergeben, aber die
Reduktionsfaktoren für Cs und Ag wären geringer geblieben . Diese Abschätzungen stehen
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nicht in Widerspruch zu kürzlich durchgeführten Bestrahlungsexperimenten an modernen
TRISO-Brennelementen bei hohen Temperaturen, welche erheblich höhere Freisetzungen
als erwartet ergaben.
Solange Kugelhaufen-spezifische Ursachen für die erhöhten Coretemperaturen nicht
ausgeschlossen werden können, müssen sie für Betrieb und Auslegungsstörfälle zukünftiger
Reaktoren konservativ unterstellt werden. Dazu ist anzumerken, dass der AVR nur für
insgesamt weniger als 4 Jahre bei Heißgastemperaturen > 900°C betrieben wurde . Damit
sind Kühlkreislaufkontaminationen moderner Reaktoren (900°C Kühlgastemperatur, 400
MWth , TRISO Brennstoff, 32 Volllastjahre) zu erwarten, die zu Betriebsende absolut gesehen
mindestens in der gleichen Größenordnung wie beim AVR liegen . Daraus resultieren große
Sicherheitsprobleme, weil – wie Sicherheitsstudien ausweisen – die im Kühlkreislauf
akkumulierte Aktivität einen entscheidenden Beitrag zu Quelltermen von Auslegungstörfällen
liefert und weil Wartung und Rückbau unzulässig behindert werden. Als weitere in
zukünftigen Reaktoren zu berücksichtigende Folge unzulässig hoher Temperaturen ist die
Überschreitung von Temperaturgrenzen zu nennen, oberhalb welcher brennbare
Gasmischungen bei Wassereinbruchstörfällen auftreten . Dieses gilt jedoch nur für Anlagen
mit Dampfkreislauf oder Prozesswärmeanlagen ohne Zwischenkreislauf. Bei Wasser-
einbrüchen muss zudem das Eindringen von flüssigem Wasser in den Kugelhaufen, wie es
bei einem AVR-Störfall vorkam, konstruktiv ausgeschlossen werden um einen möglichen
positiven Void-Koeffizienten der Reaktivität mit Reaktivitätsexkursion zu verhindern.
Kriterien für eine maximal tolerable akkumulierte Aktivität im HTR-Kühlkreislauf wurden auf
der Basis deutscher Verordnungen für Auslegungsstörfäle sowie aufgrund von
Anforderungen aus Wartung und Rückbau entwickelt . Die Anwendung dieser Kriterien auf
Kugelhaufenreaktoren führt zum Schluss, dass ein gasdichtes Containment auch dann
erforderlich ist, wenn keine überhöhten Coretemperaturen unterstellt werden . Durch ein
gasdichtes Containment werden aber die mit Wartung und Rückbau zusammenhängenden
Probleme nicht beeinflusst. Unzulässig hohe Coretemperaturen vergrößern diese Probleme
erheblich. Ein sicherer Betrieb eines Kugelhaufenreaktors bei Temperaturen nahe denen für
Prozesswärmenutzung erforderlichen ist damit gegenwärtig auch mit einem gasdichten
Containment nicht zu garantieren.
Daher werden zusätzlich zu einem gasdichten Containment Maßnahmen diskutiert, um trotz
der Unsicherheiten bei Coretemperaturen und der Akkumulation von Aktivität im HTR-
Primärkreislauf einen sicheren Reaktorbetrieb zu gewährleisten . Eine Option besteht in der
Verringerung der Anforderungen an zukünftige Reaktoren (Heißgastemperaturen,
Brennstoffabbrand), eine andere ist ein sehr umfangreiches F+E-Pogramm zur Lösung der
nachstehend aufgeführten Probleme im Normalbetrieb und bei Auslegungsstörfällen:
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- Entwicklung eines neuen Brennelementes, welches metallische Spaltprodukte im
Langzeitbetrieb hinreichend zurückhält . Für Prozesswärmeanwendungen muss auch
die Rückhaltung nichtmetallischer Spaltprodukte verbessert werden
- Entwicklung einer zuverlässigen Qualitätskontrolle für Brennelemente
- Experimente zur Jodfreisetzung aus Brennelementen für Bedingungen von
Coreaufheizstörfällen
- Zuverlässige Modellierbarkeit der HTR-Temperaturen und der Kugelhaufenmechanik
einschließlich von Kugelbruchvorgängen und deren Auswirkungen
-
Schnelle und zuverlässige lokale Messung (direkt oder indirekt) von
sicherheitsrelevanten Parametern wie Temperaturen im Kugelhaufencore
- Zuverlässige Modellierbarkeit des Spaltprodukttransportes im Kühlkreislauf,
Entwicklung von Methoden zur Verhinderung der unkontrollierbaren
Spaltproduktakkumulation im Kreislauf
- Entwicklung eines schnellen Verfahrens zur Messung der Freisetzung von
metallischen Spaltprodukten
- Materialentwicklung für Prozesswärmekomponenten
- HTR-spezifische Rückbau- und Endlagerungsprobleme
Ein umfangreich instrumentierter experimenteller Kugelhaufenreaktor wäre zur Lösung
dieser Probleme unverzichtbar. Bevor ein F+E-Programm dieser Größe begonnen wird sollte
eine Machbarkeitsstudie einschließlich Aufwandsabschätzung durchgeführt werden, um das
ökonomische Risiko dieser Entwicklung zu quantifizieren.
In Hinblick auf auslegungsüberschreitende Störfälle sind Sicherheitsprobleme bei
Lufteinbruch/Corebrand noch nicht hinreichend gelöst . Eine vergleichende Sicherheitsstudie
von Kugelhaufen-HTR, Block-HTR und Generation-III LWR wäre hilfreich, um eine
zuverlässigere Aussage zur Sicherheit gegenwärtiger Kugelhaufen-HTR-Konzepte zu
bekommen: Frühere Sicherheitsstudien für Kugelhaufenreaktoren müssen aus heutiger Sicht
als zu optimistisch angesehen werden .
VII
CONTENT
1 . INTRODUCTION
	
1
2. AVR CORE TEMPERATURES
	
3
2.1 Measurement technique and results
2.2 Interpretations of unintentional high temperatures
3. RE-EVALUATION OF FISSION PRODUCT RELEASE FROM AVR CORE INTO
THE COOLANT CIRCUIT
	
8
3.1 Release data
	
8
3.2 Influence of unintentional temperatures on fission product release
	
11
3.3 Release mechanisms of metallic fission products
	
12
3.4 Interpretation of AVR release rates after hot gas temperature increase to 950°C
	
15
3.5 Dependence of activity release from AVR core on the core composition
	
17
3.6 Comparison of HTR and LWR fission product behaviour
	
23
4. RELEVANCE OF AVR EXPERIENCE FOR FUTURE PEBBLE BED REACTORS
24
4.1 Maximum permissible environmental release in design basis accidents
4.2 Consequences of AVR experience for water ingress accidents
4.3 Consequences of AVR experience for core heat-up accidents
24
29
30
5. CONCLUSION 30
ACKNOWLEDGEMENT 33
REFERENCES 34
3
5
VIII
1 . Introduction
The AVR was the first pebble bed HTR worldwide and was operated 1967-88 in Juelich . Main
aim of this experimental reactor was the principal test of the pebble bed core and test of
many different types of pebble shaped fuel elements . Design data of the AVR [1,3] are
collected in table I . A sketch of the reactor and of some relevant components is presented in
fig . 1 . AVR was equipped with a double wall pressure vessel and with a gas tight
containment, in order to compensate the wrong fuel quality (no coated fuel particles) in the
AVR design period . However at operation start the meanwhile developed better retaining
coated particle fuel element was used . Containment and double wall pressure vessel were
however not able to withstand certain sequences of water ingress accidents by tube rupture
in the steam generator . Water ingress accidents became therefore design basis accidents in
AVR.
The AVR pebble bed core consists of about 100000 graphite pebbles, which each contain in
their centre part usually about 10000 to 40000 multicoated fuel particles . Diverse fuel types
with different coatings were used (see [3], p . 313). Except of GLE-1 type (see chapter 3 .4) all
fuel pebbles contained 1 g U-235, but the total heavy metal content varied from 6 to 11 g.
After a residence time of 4 - 40 (average 6 - 8) months in the core the fuel elements reach
the defueling tube at the core bottom and are re-fed to the core top . This is repeated until the
final burn-up is met and then the fuel element is replaced by a fresh one . In order to achieve
a radial more even temperature profile low power fuel elements are fed into the core centre
and fresh ones into the outer regions. Pebble flow velocities are higher in the inner than in
the outer core region . Helium cools the core in up flow direction . A steam generator is
arranged in the top of the pressure vessel.
Power / Average power
density
46 MWth (15 MWel) / 2 .5 MW/m³
Cycle Steam cycle with the steam generator (73 bar) inside
the reactor vessel
Core height / diameter 2.8 m / 3 m
Coolant / Pressure He / 10 .8 bar
He outlet / inlet temperature 1 st phase until 02/1974: < 850°C ; 2nd phase from
02/1974 : < 950 (990)°C / 275°C
He-flow 13 – 15.5 kg/s (depending on desired gas outlet
temperature) in up flow direction
Fuel Core: 100000 matrix graphite pebbles (6 cm diam .)
containing coated fuel particles. Diverse fuel types, at
end mainly improved TRISO fuel
Table I : Main design data of AVR pebble bed reactor
1
Fig . 1 : Scheme of the AVR (a) with fuel element (b), view on core from top (c) and fuelling
facilities
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Although several improvements are foreseen for future pebble bed reactors AVR is in many
respect still their paragon, also because the larger demonstration reactor THTR (750 MWth)
suffered from diverse problems and was operated thus only for less than 1 .5 full power
years. R&D on pebble bed reactors was limited since the end of AVR operation and thus its
experience is still of major relevance . Particularly because hot gas temperatures of up to
almost 1000°C were achieved in AVR, which allow for process heat applications, the pebble
bed technology finds major interest worldwide . This paper focuses on some unresolved and
insufficiently published safety relevant problems which occurred during AVR operation, and
outlines consequences for future pebble reactor concepts. The widely published
advantageous features [1,44] of pebble bed HTRs are out of the scope of this paper.
At the moment AVR undergoes dismantling, which became complicated due to a pronounced
contamination of the primary circuit with Sr-90 and Cs-137 . Particularly highly radiotoxic Sr-
90 creates safety concern because this contamination is partly present in mobile, dust borne
form. Accordingly, the reactor vessel will be grouted with light concrete which immobilizes
dust and stabilizes the vessel, and will be stored for some decades outside of the AVR site,
until a procedure for final dismantling is developed . A re-evaluation of the heavy primary
circuit contamination is performed in this paper. Besides the standard explanation that an
insufficient fuel quality was primarily responsible for that [1a], also other reasons like
overheating of fuel elements by inadmissible high core temperatures, as detected at the end
of AVR operation, will be examined . Further other safety relevant experience from AVR
operation will be discussed and conclusions for future reactors will be drawn.
2. AVR core temperatures
2.1 Measurement technique and results
There is no way of a contemporary measurement of active core temperatures in pebble bed
HTRs, in contrast to other reactors, because the pebble movement destroys all standard
detection equipments . Hot gas temperature profiles outside of the active core were measured
occasionally in AVR [20, 40], but core temperatures were based for most of the AVR
operation time on calculations only . For average AVR hot gas temperatures of 950°C
maximum surface temperatures of fuel elements were originally calculated to 1070°C [2].
Depending on the fission power of the respective fuel element, maximum coated particle
temperatures are up to 120 K higher . Modern fuel elements were designed for a maximum
coated particle temperature in long term normal operation of < 1250°C . However sufficient
irradiation tests were until recently (see chapter 3 .3) available only for lower temperatures or
low burn-up [48] . This is because irradiations concentrated on the less stringent conditions of
the HTR-Module200 (see chapter 4 .1) .
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In this paper, the term core temperature means fuel element surface temperature . A crude
method for measurement of maximum core temperatures in pebble bed HTRs was
developed already 1970 to 1972 [8,30] . Limited tests were performed for the less problematic
inner core region only, but revealed temperatures of up to about 100 K higher than calculated
at hot gas temperatures of 750°C and 850°C . There was however an alteration of the feeding
rate into the inner core from 1971 to 1981 (see chapter 3 .5), which complicates a comparison
to other operation periods . An improved technique was applied from September, 1986 [1b,3]:
190 graphite pebbles equipped with 20 melt wires (melting points from 650 - 1280°C) were
fed onto the core top . Following precalculations, all monitor pebbles passed the hottest part
of the core within of about one month, and in this period the AVR hot gas temperature was
hold at 950°C . The monitor pebbles detected the maximum gas temperature a pebble
passes through during its flow through the core, plus some minor contribution by y and
neutron heating of 8 + 2 K [8] . For the hot core top the maximum gas temperature was
calculated to be 30 + 10 K below the adjacent fuel element surface temperature, see
Collection of Reactor Physics Data 1983 in [25] . This together means that maximum core
temperatures are about 22 + 12 K higher than maximum temperatures measured by monitor
pebbles.
Range of
maximum
temperature
Percentage of monitor pebbles belonging to the given range of
maximum temperatures, separated for monitor pebbles fed onto
radial inner core [%]
	
radial outer core [%]
[°C]
920 - 1072 35 (25 > 1050°C) 0
1073 -1280 58 69
> 1280 7 31
Table II : Maximum gas temperatures in the AVR active core during normal operation as
measured by monitor pebbles (starting 09/1986) . Corresponding core (fuel
element surface) temperatures are about 20 K higher.
The temperature results are summarized in table II . More detailed data on temperatures and
insertion of monitor pebbles are found in [50,54] . 144 monitor pebbles left the core until mid
1988 [1b,3] . The not evaluated 46 pebbles belong mainly to the outer core region, which may
be explained by a smaller pebble flow rate adjacent to the wall . Except of about 1/3 of the
pebbles fed into the radial inner core zone, all pebbles revealed higher temperatures than the
maximum of 1070°C, originally calculated for licensing of the operation at hot gas
temperatures of 950°C [2], 1/3 of the pebbles fed into the radial outer zone even by more
than 200 K. Precalculations with improved codes of maximum central temperatures of
monitor pebbles for the temperature measurement campaign resulted in values of 1123°C for
the outer core and 1051°C for the inner core [30] . In line with that later temperature
calculations revealed for certain AVR core compositions maximum core temperatures as high
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as 1140°C . This however holds for a limited time and for a small volume fraction of the core
of less than 1 % at temperatures greater than 1100°C only. Accordingly, the deviations to
measurements remain large . Postexaminations on monitor pebbles were performed in order
to exclude that errors, e .g. mixing of melt wire positions, may have occurred [51] . The
influences of a reactor shut down beginning of November, 1986 on measured temperatures
was examined, too and found to be negligible [51].
Gaseous [1a] and metallic (see fig . 3) fission product release was normal or even small
during the temperature measurement campaign . This indicates that the temperature
elevations did not occur during the campaign only, but in whole AVR operation.
The absolute maximum temperature was not measured, because it was higher than the
highest melting point of the melt wires used . True maximum core temperatures in the inner
respectively outer core are coarsely assessed to 1320 to 1340°C respectively 1380 to
1420°C. The differences between inner and outer core reflect the fact that low power (high
burn-up) fuel was mainly fed into the inner core . The volume fraction of the outer core zone is
larger than that of the inner one, but varied with AVR fuelling . On the other hand, the
throughput in the inner core was larger.
When first temperature results became available the permit for AVR operation at 950°C hot
gas temperature was withdrawn for safety reasons and the hot gas temperature had to be
strongly reduced from beginning of 1988 ([3], p .190) . This temperature drop is seen in fig . 2.
For that there was no possibility to repeat the measurement of absolute maximum core
temperatures with melt wires of higher melting points . Altogether, the AVR should no longer
be taken as reference for a safe and reliable reactor operation at gas temperatures allowing
process heat applications, as is e .g. done as foundation of pebble bed VHTR development in
the context of Generation IV [35].
Ironically, the pebble bed HTR concept has probably survived until now only as consequence
of one of his weak points, its insufficient in-core instrumentation abilities : In case of known
AVR core temperatures from beginning of its operation, the AVR hot gas temperatures would
have been limited to values far below 950°C . This means that its main advantage, its
apparent capability for process heat generation, would not have been demonstrated.
2.2 Interpretations of unintentional high temperatures
The reasons for the high AVR core temperatures could not be clarified up to now [9,39] . It is
not even completely clear, whether there were several hot spots of limited volume in the core
or even large regions of high temperatures . However, the pronounced fission product release
discussed in chapter 3 suggests a large fraction of fuel elements with inadmissible high
temperatures in the AVR core . Several AVR specific but also pebble bed immanent and
general reasons and their combinations are in discussion (coolant bypass flows inside and/or
outside of the active core, power peaks near to AVR reflector noses, uncertainties in pebble
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bed stochastics, locally densified pebble bed with high flow resistance, human errors in
fuelling procedure, uncertainties in pebble flow behaviour, uncertain burn-up measurements
particularly until 1981, power asymmetry in the core, cones of pebbles on the core top, flow
anomalies by the broken AVR bottom reflector [18] etc .) . Detailed examinations were
performed up to now, but only for AVR specific and general, but not sufficiently for pebble bed
immanent reasons . Complicating it was found that some effects compensate others, e .g.
bypasses cool down regions with elevated nuclear heating.
The sophisticated fuelling procedure in AVR as described in chapter 1 contributes to these
uncertainties : The fuel element feeding frequency at different positions was varied several
times . Unfortunately, the fuelling was not performed in a sufficiently radial symmetric manner,
as was discovered in 1985. In detail, the feeding foreseen to the centre axis occurred with a
shift of 0 .5 m to one side (see fig. 1 d). This leads to still more complicated pebble flow and
may have been one reason of the azimuthal power asymmetry. Altogether, pebble flow
behaviour, whose detailed knowledge is essential for neutronics and thermohydraulic
calculations, was never completely understood during AVR operation : Deviations between
calculated and observed residence time spectra of fuel elements in the inner core reached
up to about 30 % even at the end of AVR operation . This means that the spatial distribution of
fissiles in the core was not exactly known . One reason for these discrepancies is the small
experimental basis of pebble flow dynamics in HTR pebble beds : The basic experiment on
flow of individual pebbles in beds was performed with glass pebbles in an organic liquid [1c].
Although this experiment was obviously far away from conditions in pebble bed reactors, its
qualitative results are assumed to be valid for pebble bed HTRs . Also, all experiments on
graphite pebble beds, giving information about residence time spectra, were unfortunately
performed under non representative friction conditions : The friction of graphite is strongly
reduced in presence of a chemisorbed oxygen layer, which was present in all experiments.
Such a layer is instantaneously formed in ambient atmosphere, but is destroyed at HTR
operation temperatures in Helium . Accordingly, the friction in all simulation experiments using
graphite pebbles was much smaller than in real HTR pebble beds . This became obvious after
several years of AVR and THTR operation by very strong deviations between measured and
predicted residence time spectra of fuel elements in the core.
3D computer simulation revealed [12] that around reflector noses temperatures are higher by
up to 80 K due to neutronics effects, i .e. this may explain only part of the observed
temperature enhancement . Similar holds for other AVR specific reasons [20], as bypasses
inside and outside of the active core . Temperature measurements by monitor pebbles in the
inner core during an AVR experiment (loss of coolant accident simulation) [13] did not show
deviations from calculated maximum temperatures : In this experiment there was no forced
flow, but nuclear heating for simulation of the decay heat . This may be taken as an indication,
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that flow plays a major role as reason for high temperatures . Temperatures in reflector noses
measured in 1988 revealed remarkable azimuthal differences of up to 200 K at full power
operation and hot gas temperatures of about 750°C . These azimuthal temperature
differences decreased only to 140 K, when blowers were stopped but nuclear heating
remained at 4 MW. This points to the before mentioned power asymmetry, as 3D
thermo/fluiddynamic calculations indicated [32].
At present some effort is spent in clarification of the inadmissible AVR-temperatures by
advanced codes, as operated by PBMR: Particularly a combination of several AVR specific
reasons is under examination, but pebble bed immanent reasons as pebble bed
densifications afford major attention, too : A statistically generated pebble bed has a void
fraction of about 0 .4, and this is assumed for HTR pebble beds in average . Achievable
minimum void fractions in pebble beds are however as low as 0 .26. Regions with low void
fractions show substantially higher temperatures mainly because of their strongly enlarged
pressure drop, i .e. reduced cooling, but also because of an enlarged power density. The
temperature increase by densification depends on the size of the densified region : Several
hundred K are expected for densified regions of some thousand pebbles . During AVR
construction it became obvious, that movement of pebble beds leads to pronounced pebble
bed densifications, because the densest pebble bed represents the equilibrium state . In order
to avoid densification indentations were worked into the AVR side reflector surface.
Experiments on beds of small metal pebbles at room temperature in air showed that this
measure prevents from major pebble bed densifications for the whole experimental bed [1c].
It remains however unclear, whether the latter result is representative for real HTR pebble
beds with their large friction and high temperatures : It remains to be shown, that HTR pebble
bed densifications can be excluded also in some distance from the reflector surface . A
remarkable increase of pebble bed densities was observed in THTR, whose reasons are
controversially discussed.
Clustering of low burn-up, high power fuel elements in the core have also to be considered
as reason of high temperature regions.
A complete 3D simulation of AVR thermohydraulics, neutronics and pebble bed mechanics is
currently undertaken to resolve the problem . However the data situation in AVR concerning
core temperatures, power distribution etc . is very poor also due to the lack of in-core
instrumentation. For that and because of complicated pebble bed mechanics and fuelling
there are doubts, whether one single explanation can be found and whether pebble bed
immanent reasons as partial densification of the pebble bed or clusters of high power fuel
elements can be excluded . Probably, only a future operation of a representative large scale
experiment or of an experimental pebble bed reactor can convincingly answer the remaining
questions .
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Experience of the THTR pebble bed reactor also gives hints to enhanced temperatures:
Failure of insulation attachment bolts in the hot gas duct was probably caused by thermal
fatigue due to excessive temperature gradients across the core outlet . One explanation is
that debris of broken pebbles has strongly diminished the pebble flow velocity in the outer
core zone compared to the inner region, which changed the radial power distribution.
Reduced flow velocities of fuel elements in pebble beds may lead to inadmissible high burn-
up and accelerated fission product release . In an annular pebble bed core with a centre
graphite column the pebble bed surfaces contacting reflectors are particularly large and
accordingly, the regions with delayed pebble flow, too.
3. Re-evaluation of fission product release from AVR core into the
coolant circuit
3.1 Release data
Measurements of Cs, Sr and Ag release from AVR core by a deposition tube in the hot gas
region (VAMPYR-I, see fig . 1) revealed, that the fission product release into the primary
circuit strongly accelerated 1974 – 1976, correlating with the hot gas temperature increase
from 850 to 950°C in February, 1974 . Time dependent accumulated release values mainly
based on measurements in VAMPYR-I and corresponding average hot gas temperatures are
shown in figure 2 . Specific Cs-137 coolant activities are shown in fig . 3.
Fig . 2: Time dependent average hot gas temperatures (above) and accumulated activity
release into the AVR primary circuit estimated from VAMPYR-I hot gas filter results for
Cs-137 and Sr-90 with uncertainty scatter (below) . Core inventories are from [49].
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These specific coolant activities are approximately proportional to the core release rate . Time
dependent accumulated releases for Cs in a linear scaling are presented in fig . 7. Data of fig.
2 are taken from [1a] except the Sr-90 branch labelled as ‘new evaluation’ . In a revaluation
Sr-90 estimations of [1a] were found to be not consistent with VAMPYR-I results and too low:
For operational safety and cost reasons Sr-90 measurements in VAMPYR-I were abandoned
mid of 1974 and were replaced by Eu-154 measurements, considering that Eu-154 shows a
similar release behaviour as Sr-90 . However for generation of Sr-values in [1a] Sr-90 and Sr-
89 data of the AVR cold gas region (cold gas filter) were used for the period until mid of 1976.
From mid of 1976 Sr-90 data from the cold gas filter led to inconsistent release rates
because of continuous Sr-90 accumulation in the dust (see chapter 3 .4) . For that solely Sr-89
results of the cold gas filter were considered in [1a] from end of 1976, assuming that there is
no substantial diffusion induced delay of the core release . However, as seen from fig . 2 and
discussed in chapters 3 .4 and 3.3 the diffusion induced delay is about by a factor 5 larger
than the halve life of Sr-89 (50 d) . This means that the method applied in [1a] underestimated
Sr-90 release rates from 1977 by a factor of 10 – 50 . Thus the conclusion from [1a] that after
1977 only a negligible Sr-90 release took place and a continuous declination of the Sr-90
activity occurred by radioactive decay is too optimistic . Eu-154 release rates measured in
VAMPYR-I guide in the same direction : For June – September 1984 the relative Eu-154
release rates are by a factor of 20 larger than relative Sr-90 release rates as assumed in
[1a] . A re-estimation of Sr-90 release rates based on Eu-154 measurements in VAMPYR-I,
which are available for 1974 – 1984, is shown as bold line in fig . 2, too . Activities in 1984
became about a factor of 1 .2 larger than assumed in [1a] . This reflects that the Sr-release did
not stop in 1976 as erroneously assumed in [1a] but continued.
Fig .3: Specific Cs-137 activities in hot gas as measured in VAMPYR-I depending on
average hot gas temperatures . VAMPYR-I coolant activities are known to be too low
by a factor of 5 to 10.
It is supposed that the time dependence of the releases in fig . 2 and 4 is approximately
correct, although the absolute values are now known to be too low . This was probably due to
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insufficient mixing of hot gas at the gas inlet of VAMPYR-I : A pronounced azimuthal and
radial hot gas temperature gradient existed in AVR at the niveau of VAMPYR-I [20] : Release
rates measured in VAMPYR-I are not representative for the whole core, but preferently for
some cooler outer core regions [24] . This is probably due to bypass flows streaming into
direction of VAMPYR-I and – looking on the power asymmetry – to the position of VAMPYR-I
in a azimuthal core region with low temperatures . This underestimation becomes also
obvious, if release rates measured in VAMPYR-II [21], which allowed more accurate
measurements but was operated 1987-88 only, are compared to values of VAMPYR-I : Cs-
137 release rates of VAMPYR-II [21] are up to a factor of 3 to 30 higher than those of
VAMPYR-I, although even VAMPYR-II is known to underestimate release rates . The final
filter of VAMPYR-II in downflow direction, which contained Cs, was not evaluated [41].
Further, VAMPYR-II sampled gas of average hot gas temperature, which is not conservative
because of the exponential temperature dependence of release rates.
Another strong indication for an underestimation of release rates by VAMPYR-I is the low
metallic fission product deposition per coolant pass, calculated from VAMPYR-I and cold gas
filter [5], in comparison with model calculations . Further, some coarse post operation
examinations in course of AVR dismantling came to the conclusion that in 2002 about 3 10 13
Bq of Cs-137 were present in the primary circuit [34] . Some loose dust containing metallic
fission products was however already removed at this time and is not included in that
balance. This is equivalent to an underestimation of Cs-release rates by about a factor of 3 to
4 in [1a] . The uncertainty range of accumulated Cs-137 and Sr-90 release expected on basis
of these considerations is shown in fig . 2, too. Additional measurements on AVR
contamination, which are performed in course of dismantling, have to be included into these
estimations . Recent still unpublished data of the AVR-contamination as assumed for the
approval of the dismantling [46] are in the same range as estimated in this paper, i .e.
remarkably higher than in [1a].
Considering AVR volume flow and underestimation of release rates by VAMPYR-I the core
release rates R of Cs-137 are calculated from coolant activities A of fig . 3 as follows:
R [Bq/s] = 500 ·A [Bq/m³STP]
The core release rate of Sr-90 for a core composition as in the time period 1974-78 at a hot
gas temperature of 950°C was calculated to 20 GBq/y by standard diffusion models/data
[24], i .e. several orders of magnitude smaller than observed . Unfortunately, the enhanced
release of metallic fission products was detected with several months of delay only, when
already a major contamination had happened: This was, because a fast release
measurement of metallic fission products does not exist . In addition -in contrast to
expectations- no conspicuous release of easily detectable noble gases by fuel failure
accompanied the release of metallic fission products . Further, calculations of the total primary
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contamination on basis of VAMPYR-I data [23] were erroneous until 1988 and
underestimated the Cs-137 contamination compared even to data of [1a] in fig . 2 and 4 by a
factor of 5 . Accordingly, during reactor operation the contamination was not taken as serious
as it was and no consequences were drawn.
The release mechanism of all metallic fission products will be discussed in detail in chapter
3 .3 . In rating the releases of metallic fission products in comparison with future power
reactors it has to be noted, that AVR-operation at hot gas temperatures > 900°C, when most
of the releases occurred, sums up to only 4 years.
Graphite dust of the AVR primary circuit contained also small but radiotoxic relevant
quantities of actinides (Pu-241, Am-241), mainly caused by pebble rupture and destruction of
coated particles. Because of larger compressive loads in advanced HTRs [5] this problem
has to be examined more detailed . Here, unexploited THTR experience should be
considered, too [10] : The large fuel element rupture in THTR can be attributed to a major part
to rod movement in the core, but other compressive loads may have contributed, too.
An important consequence of the large primary circuit contamination, which is mainly found
in loose and adhesively bonded dust, is the amplification of AVR dismantling costs (see
chapter 1) . Another consequence was discovered 1994 : In course of a slow accidental
steam/water ingress of 2.75·104 kg in 1978 [3], about 1500 GBq of the accumulated Sr-90
was washed out, together with 105 GBq of H-3 . The reason why Cs-137 was washed out in a
smaller fraction than Sr-90 is not known, but may be due to smaller Cs-concentrations in
regions, affected by liquid water. Some of the water contaminated with Sr-90 and H-3 leaked
by human error into the reactor grounding, from where it reached the surrounding soil
[18,53] . The soil contamination on the AVR site ranges from 1 to 1200 Bq Sr-90/kg [53] . A
decontamination will take place after removal of the reactor. Because the steam generator
leak was small, this accident was not a design basis accident : Core temperatures were
already low when large water amounts were present and thus the extent of the
graphite/steam reaction remained limited.
3.2 Influence of unintentional temperatures on fission product release
Assuming that maximum temperatures measured in 1986-87 are not higher than in 1974-76
it becomes clear, that the enhanced fission product release is correlated to overheating : Hot
gas temperatures of 850°C led to release rates by 2 - 4 orders of magnitude smaller (fig . 2).
This conclusion is supported by measurements of fission product release in the US-Peach
Bottom HTR with well known, continuously measured core temperatures (operated 1967 - 74
with block type fuel, representing a similar fuel development stage in its core 2 as AVR 1970-
78): Particularly the Sr release was by several orders of magnitude smaller than in AVR
[7,22], but also Cs-release in Peach Bottom was substantially lower than in AVR.
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The fraction of defective coated particles in Peach Bottom core 2 was even at 3 .4 % [33] due
to a high density of particles in the matrix . Average coated particle defect fractions in AVR
varied with time but were smaller. In the period 1974 - 76 a limited increase of iodine and of
noble gas release rates was observed in AVR [1a] . This enhanced release cannot be
attributed to intact particles (see chapter 3 .3) . The observed increase is however partly due
to accelerated diffusion out of defective particles by higher temperature . An increase of the
average coated particle failure fraction by a factor of 2 to 4 is estimated from that release
data, which obviously cannot explain the release enhancement of metallic fission products.
This underlines that a strong correlation between coated particle defect fraction and release
of metallic fission products does not necessarily exist (see also chapter 3 .4).
For completion it has to be noted, that the average AVR hot gas temperature was in 1976
due to a calculation error for several months even at about 990°C, see fig . 2, which
accelerated release of metallic fission products.
3.3 Release mechanisms of metallic fission products
We have to distinguish 3 sources of fission products : Intact coated particles, particles with
defective coatings and the uranium contamination of the graphite resulting from
manufacturing . Progress of fuel element technology (e .g. SiC coating) diminished the fraction
of uranium in defective particles and uranium contamination during AVR operation from 10 -2
to 10-4 . Non metals are virtually completely retained by intact particle coatings, i .e. the fuel
element acts as an efficient barrier and a partial release occurs from defective particles and
uranium contamination only. Metallic fission products however diffuse even through intact
coatings and the latter become penetrable at high temperatures [26] . For that, the fuel
element is a sufficient barrier for metallic fission products only up to a certain temperature
limit, which depends on mobility of the metal and on the irradiation time . For temperatures
below these limits, i .e. negligible release rates from intact coated particles, the release of Cs
and Ag is caused by the small level of uranium contamination and defective coated particles.
Diffusion through barriers is characterized by 2 parameters : The breakthrough time tB reflects
the initial diffusion phase before steady state diffusion is reached and characterizes the
maximum retention time of a barrier:
tB = l2/(6D)
with l = coating thickness, D = diffusion coefficient of fission product in coating . Steady state
diffusion rates in coatings are proportional to D/l . Because of the temperature dependence of
diffusion in solids the breakthrough time decreases, and the stationary diffusion rate
increases with increasing temperature . Besides temperatures there are other parameters
accelerating diffusion rates in HTR fuel, as burn-up and neutron fluence . However, these
parameters are not fully understood . Fig. 4 contains a scheme of break through.
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Fig . 4: Schematic diagram of diffusive break through out of an infinite reservoir
through a diffusion barrier for 2 different temperatures (t B = break through
time)
The following table III contains the breakthrough time at 1250°C (maximum coated particle
design temperature) for different barrier components of HTR fuel pebbles . Buffer layer and
LTI-PyC are not considered, because their retention capability is small compared to other
barriers (except for the unique LTI-BISO coating in fuel type GLE-1, see chapter 3 .4) . The
data scatter of about one order of magnitude reflects uncertainties of diffusion coefficients
[21,27] . The breakthrough time can be only approximately used as an indicator for the start of
a significant fission product release : Because of the continuous increase of long lived fission
product concentrations in normal operation t B represents a lower limit for break through, if
within of the break through time tB the fission product concentration in the kernel sufficiently
increased. On the other hand, for t = tB already some release has taken place, which
depends on the ratio of coating thickness to kernel diameter. This release is for coated
particles already at several percent.
Nuclide Breakthrough time tB [d] in
HTI-PyC
(85 µm, BISO)
SiC A3 matrix graphite
(35 µm, TRISO) (5 mm)
Sr-90 1 - 10 10 - 100 < 200
Ag-110m 1 - 10 10 - 100 < 0.5
Cs-137 1000 - 10000 50 - 500 1
Tab. III :
	
Breakthrough time tB [d] for metallic fission products at 1250°C in components
of HTR fuel pebbles
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Altogether, not only the temperature is a relevant parameter for release estimates of metallic
fission products but even more the temperature dose (temperature * time) . There is also
some influence of burn-up and neutron dose, both accelerating diffusion.
Fig . 5: Schematic comparison of the temperature dependence of Cs-release in former
HTI-BISO- and modern LTI-TRISO fuel elements in long term normal
operation
Additional diffusion calculations indicate that in oxide kernels the Sr-retention is dominated
by interaction with the kernel, which has to be considered in addition to the data of table III . In
contrast the graphite is the dominant Sr retention barrier for carbide fuel kernels.
Chemisorption of metallic fission products in matrix graphite, which is modelled by a partition
coefficient at the graphite/gas boundary, also increases the retention for Sr . Table III indicates
that for TRISO-fuel breakthrough is possible at 1250°C for all nuclides during fuel irradiation
time (3 to 4 y, about 1/3 at high temperatures), but the release rate remains small for Sr due
to retention by the oxide kernel . For HTI-BISO fuel no Cs-breakthrough has to be expected,
but Ag-release and in case of carbide kernels also Sr-release is larger compared to TRISO
oxide fuel . Accordingly, Cs-retention in intact TRISO coated particles is worse compared to
former HTI-BISO fuel . On the other hand, modern TRISO fuel strongly reduces the uranium
contamination of graphite and thus the release rates of iodine and noble gases in normal
operation . Altogether, modern TRISO fuel represents a compromise and may create greater
problems concerning Cs-release at high temperatures . Fig. 5 compares schematically the
temperature dependent Cs-release for former BISO and modern TRISO fuel elements in long
term normal operation .
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A recent irradiation of 5 modern German fuel elements at high temperatures [37] discovered
a worse behaviour than expected . GLE-4 LEU fuel elements representing the highest quality
achieved in the German HTR fuel program were used . GLE-4 fuel elements (1 g U-235, 6 g
total heavy metal) were also present in AVR during its final operation . The experiment was
undertaken in order to demonstrate the applicability of present HTR fuel for Very High
Temperature Reactor (VHTR) applications. Experimental conditions were as follows:
Maximum pebble central temperature 1250°C, average temperatures in the particle
containing zone about 1150°C, pebble surface temperatures 1000 – 1050°C, irradiation time
about 1 y, burn-up 11 .1 % fima . It has to be noted that the burn-up target value of 15 .4 %
fima was not reached. Even though the number of defective particles increased by a factor of
about 10 more during irradiation than expected and also a “significant” release of Cs and Ag
out of the fuel elements was observed . The latter remains to be quantified . During this
experiment there was by human error a temperature excursion of about 250 – 300 K for a
short period, which however was not expected to be responsible for the large activity release.
Short term temperature excursions in earlier irradiations (FRJ2-K15/3) resulted in an
increased noble gas release during the enhanced temperature period only. An ongoing
similar experiment with GLE-4 fuel elements at about 150 K lower temperatures does not
show up to now higher noble gas releases than expected . These results underline that even
modern HTR fuel is not yet suitable for high temperature applications, and that the maximum
design temperature of fuel particles of 1250°C for current TRISO fuel is too optimistic and
should be reduced by about 100 – 150 K.
3.4 Interpretation of AVR release rates after hot gas temperature increase to 950°C
Looking on fig . 2 and 4 it becomes obvious, that the temperature increase starting February,
1974 leads with a delay of about 0 .5 to 1 .5 y to release rates of Sr and Cs by about 3 orders
of magnitude larger than before. The Ag-110m release became even almost complete soon
after temperature increase and thus its increase is smaller . The delayed start of the release is
mainly due to diffusion effects (see chapter 3 .3), but a slowly increasing particle failure
fraction (GLE-1, see below) has contributed for Cs, too . An AVR fuel element does not
remain at constant temperatures, but undergoes temperature cycling down to temperatures
of about 300°C during its flow through the core . This enlarges diffusion break through times.
Sr-90-release was dominated by diffusion out of high enriched UC2-kernels of GK BISO fuel
elements: Only one GK-fuel element (of about 25 examined) without release of Eu as
indicator for Sr was found after 1975 . The contribution of the uranium contamination of the
matrix graphite and of defective particles to enhanced Sr-releases remained small, because
in BISO-UC2-fuel the graphite is the dominating barrier (table III), which is acting also for
matrix contamination and defective particles . Further, fission products generated from
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uranium contamination are predominantly located in the interior of crystallites and not on
pore surfaces : This leads to an additional retention, which was also observed in AVR . A
limited number of first fuel loadings (UCC, T) was 1974 still present in the core . Their
behaviour was similar to that of GK . From 1980 improved fuel qualities and altogether lower
temperatures led to smaller release rates from core, which are however still on a safety
relevant level and will be discussed in chapter 3 .5.
For Cs-release the situation is more complex, also because of the pronounced retention
capability of HTI-BISO coatings . There was however a small charge of 2400 wrong designed
fuel elements (GLE-1 : oxide kernel, 1 .4 g U-235 i .e 40 % higher content than in other AVR
fuel elements, 20 g heavy metal, LTI-BISO coating, in AVR core from end of 1973) . For the
limited number of GLE-1 specimen examined an average coated particle failure fraction of 2
– 4 % was measured, but in one individual fuel element up to about 50 % . Due to the high
heat power of GLE-1 fuel elements the coated particle temperatures were about 120 K higher
than in other fuel elements, which accelerated particle failure rates . Because of errors in
temperature precalculations for GLE-1 these temperatures were discovered not earlier than
after some years of GLE-1 presence in AVR . The GLE-1 specific temperature enlargement
occurred in addition to general temperature enhancement described in chapter 2 . Visual
inspections of GLE-1 kernels of a fuel element with high particle failure fraction indicated
similarities to kernels, heated up in accident test to 1600°C . Thus in some GLE-1 fuel
elements particle temperatures may have exceeded 1600°C . Irradiated GLE-1 fuel elements
without major particle failure fraction were heated in FZJ to temperatures of 1500°C. Up to
1250°C GLE-1 behaved normal, but at higher temperatures an increasing number of particle
defects was observed, which reached about 25 % at 1500°C . GLE-1 fuel was completely
removed from core until 1984 before their final burn-up was reached.
A re-estimation discovered that defect particles of GLE-1 fuel elements were not
predominantly responsible for the Cs-137, in contrast to earlier assumptions [1a] . The LTI-
pyrocarbon coating of GLE-1 is the main Cs-barrier in GLE-1 . However, it is not as efficient
as HTI-pyrocarbon of other BISO fuel elements but comparable to SiC coatings in TRISO
particles. Coating failures as high temperatures have obviously accelerated the Cs-release.
Cs-release fractions measured for selected GLE-1 fuel elements amount to 2 - 6 % (burn-up
of about 5 % fima), see AVR Quarterly Progress Report III/1982 in [25] . Accordingly, the
average Cs release rate of GLE-1 was significantly larger than for other fuel elements.
Because of the small number of GLE-1 fuel elements in the core they were however not
necessarily the dominating source of Cs . In line with this interpretation even HTI-BISO GK
fuel elements with high Cs-release out of the particles of up to 25 % were found, see AVR
Quarterly Progress Report I/1983 in [25] . The latter may be taken as an indication of very
high temperatures. Considering all uncertainties the contribution of GLE-1 to the overall Cs-
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release 1974 – 78 is assumed to be in the range of 10 to 30 % . There are major contributions
from fuel elements with smaller particle defect fractions (GO : < 1%) and from uranium
contamination of the matrix graphite, but also from diffusion out of intact coated particles for
all types of fuel elements.
For future reactors it is relevant that obviously no credit can be taken from the originally
assumed strong correlation between the coating failure rate, which is easily detectable by
noble gas release, and the release rate of metallic fission products (see also chapter 3 .2).
Both are preponderant independent processes . Accordingly, enhanced release of metallic
fission products will be detected with some delay only.
3.5 Dependence of activity release from AVR core on the core composition
For future reactors it is also relevant to know the behaviour of modern TRISO fuel . For that,
we compare fission product releases from core for the period 1974-1978, when
predominantly carbide BISO fuel was in the core, with release rates from 1983-1988, when
oxide fuel with an increasing content of TRISO particles was used . Irradiation tests of modern
fuel elements, usually applied for the proof of a satisfying behaviour in normal operation, are
not available for the range of maximum AVR temperatures, but only up to 1250°C fuel central
temperature (see chapter 3.3).
In [1a] a negligible release was expected for Sr-90 after 1976 due to the better retention in
modern oxide kernels compared to carbide kernels as used in first years of AVR . As
discussed already in chapter 3 .1 this cannot be validated: Eu-154 release rates decrease by
about a factor of 20 in AVR after change to oxide fuel . This finding is supported by
accelerated irradiation tests of oxide fuel elements at temperatures > 1250°C : The irradiation
of oxide fuel elements in FRJ2-K3 experiment at surface temperatures of 1400°C resulted in
a release of even almost 10 % of Sr-90 already within 37 days [11] . At 1300°C there was only
minor release out of the fuel element in 37 days, but substantial release from particle into
graphite occurred . Irradiation experiments at 1250°C surface temperature but 104 d of
irradiation (FRJ2-K9/B 3) came to similar results as FRJ2-K3 (1300°C) . The fuel particle
temperature was high in FRJ2-K3, which partly explains the large release rate at 1400°C.
Although these fuel elements belong to an early development stage they are still
representative for Sr: The main Sr-retention, oxide kernel and matrix graphite are already
present.
There are Eu-154 and even some Sr-90 measurements in the AVR cold gas region (cold gas
filter, see fig . 1a), which however show an even smaller dependence of sampled activities on
temperature or composition of the AVR core than the VAMPYR-I experiments . This effect is
due to the predominantly dust bound status of Sr and Cs in the cold gas : Dust is continuously
settled and mobilized during operation, which means, that the cold gas filter also samples
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older dust and accordingly integrates to some extent over the prior release history . Also, the
higher the mobilization degree the higher is the content of old dust in the filters . Further, the
specific dust activity depends on the actual dust production rate . In addition, the sampled
amount of dust is influenced by gas flow perturbations during the sampling period.
Accordingly, interpretation of activity data measured in the cold gas is subject of large
uncertainties and the data are not used here.
Fig . 6: Measured Sr-diffusion coefficients in UC2 and in UO2
Sr-90 release shows a pronounced temperature dependence in oxide fuel, but a much
smaller one in carbide. Measured diffusion coefficients of Sr in UO 2 and UC2 are presented in
fig . 6 : There are 2 data sets for UO2 which reveal similar temperature dependence, but differ
in absolute values by about one order of magnitude . This difference may be due to unequal
radiation induced enhancements of diffusion . Comparing the higher UO2 diffusion coefficient
with that in UC2 we find, that both are of the same order at 1500°C, whereas at 1200°C the
diffusion in UO 2 is by a factor of about 500 slower. Taking these values a reduction factor of
20 + 10 for modern oxide fuel is in line with maximum AVR core temperatures of 1300 –
1400°C, which correspond to somewhat higher coated particle temperatures . Considering
that in carbide fuel the matrix graphite determines the Sr-release rate over a wide range of
temperature the behaviour of oxide and carbide fuel converges even more.
Whereas Sr-90 is mainly retained in the oxide kernel and in graphite but less in coatings, the
principal diffusion barrier for Cs-137 is the particle coating (SiC in TRISO or even more
BISO-HTI pyrocarbon). For Cs-137 a reduction factor of about 8 was estimated by AVR
assuming an operation only with improved and modern fuel [1a] . This was calculated on
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basis of the release behaviour of Cs-137 and of Cs-134 depending on the AVR core
composition and temperature.
Fig . 7: Accumulated Cs in AVR primary circuit as calculated from VAMPYR-I results [1a]
Fig . 7 contains the VAMPYR-I-data of both Cs-isotopes for the whole operation time 1973-
1988 in a linear scale . Particularly the declination of Cs-134 (t1/2 = 2 y) reveals that during
use of improved fuel the Cs-release rate in the AVR dropped between 1975 and 1987 by
almost 1 order of magnitude, but remained in a still significant order . In rating of fig . 7 we
have to bear in mind that a negligible release rate corresponds to a declination of the
accumulated activity, as observed in the shut down period of 1978/79 . The fact that
measurements for two Cs isotopes of different halve life exist allows a more reliable
estimation of the Cs reduction factor. However, in the period of predominant use of improved
fuel in AVR (from 1983) the average temperature was altogether lower than in the period
1973-1978 (see fig . 2 and 3). As outlined in chapter 3 .3 the release rate does not depend
only on actual temperatures, but on the whole temperature history the fuel element has seen,
respectively on the temperature dose (i .e. temperature multiplied by time) . In estimation of
the reduction factor of 8 the latter was not considered, which means, that the true reduction
is expected to be somewhat smaller . The accumulated release from 1981 to 1988 amounts to
about 30 to 35 % of that in the phase 1973 to 1978 . In comparison of releases in these both
operation periods it has to be taken into account that the fuel feeding ratio inner core to outer
core was 2 .66 in 1972 - 81, but 1 during the other AVR operation . The enlarged feeding ratio
into the inner core was set in order to flatten the radial temperature profile [3] . However
benign results of this measure were not detected and from 1981 AVR operation occurred
again with a feeding ratio of 1 [3] . For that it cannot be excluded that a feeding ratio of 2 .66
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has enlarged maximum core temperatures . Another reason for higher maximum core
temperatures in the operation time until 1981 may be the large error margin of the fuel burn-
up measurement in that period . The high Cs-release rate in the first quarter of 1978 (see fig.
3) may be connected to a high moisture level in the coolant, which was already observed
several months before of the water ingress of May, 1978.
For periods when GLE-1 fuel elements discussed in chapter 3 .4 do not contribute to release
rates, an even larger Cs-release of improved TRISO fuel may occur, as comparison of Cs-
release rates of 1973 (BISO-fuel) with those of 1987 for similar temperatures indicates (see
fig . 3).
The following additional observations underline, that Cs-diffusion out of intact coated
particles in AVR was high for improved and modern TRISO-fuel : At first the evaluation of
VAMPYR-II (see chapter 3 .2), whose Cs-release/birth ration at hot gas temperatures of
930°C (1987) was > 10-3, i .e . significantly larger than the fissile fraction outside of intact
coated particles in that period . Further, postexamination of 12 modern GLE-3 fuel elements
(TRISO, 1 g U-235, 10 g total heavy metal) irradiated in AVR from mid 1982 revealed for 2
low burn-up fuel elements (< 3 % fima, 10 % U-235) remarkable Cs diffusion out of coated
particles, see AVR Quarterly Progress Report IV/1987 in [25] . No indications for defective
particles were found for these fuel elements . Having the altogether lower operation
temperatures during GLE-3 operation compared to 1973 to 1978 in mind a fraction of 10 % of
fuel elements with release from coated particles is in line with expectations . Finally the recent
experimental results on GLE-4 [37] described in chapter 3 .3 indicate that the retention
capability of modern fuel was overestimated in the past.
Another observation in AVR remains difficult to explain : All fuel elements in AVR except those
with high release from intact coated particles are contaminated from outside, i .e . show a
significantly enlarged specific fission product activity near to their outer surface [5,23,56], as
shown in fig . 8. The conventional interpretation assumes that fission products are
recirculated via the coolant circuit into the core and deposited on cold fuel elements in the
core bottom . This interpretation conflicts with the fact that AVR cold gas contains only dust
borne metallic fission products and that the Cs-137 to Cs-134 ratio in dust is about 4 (1987-
88), as is typical for AVR contamination containing fresh and old contributions together : The
activities on outer fuel element surfaces however show a Cs-137 to Cs-134 ratio of about 1
(1987-88), as it is expected for fresh contamination released from fuel elements . Taking into
account that the contamination source is located upstream from receiving fuel elements, one
explanation to be discussed is a hot region, which releases fission products, somewhere
below the top of the active core . Standard calculations for these regions however do not
result in high temperatures . The Sr-activity on the fuel element surface of 2 examined
modern elements is also higher than in the interior.
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Concentration profiles of fission products in the fuel free outer zone of a
modern fuel element irradiated in AVR 1983-87
For Ag-110m, which is one crucial isotope for gas turbine contamination/maintenance, a by 1
order of magnitude better retention is expected in TRISO fuel, which is however
compensated by the larger Ag-110m inventory in modern low enriched fuel . Ag-110m release
rates are generally higher than those of other metals . Large Ag-110m inventories in dust on
the steam generator were detected 1986 [1a] . Their comparison with those for Sr-90, which
are only about a factor of 15 larger, indicate that Ag-110 values of fig . 2 probably
underestimate the total release by about 1 order of magnitude . Because of the very fast
diffusion of Ag in HTR fuel elements, MOX fuel with high Pu content is not suitable for HTRs:
This is because Pu-containing fuel generates far more Ag.
Accident tests of irradiated fuel elements [16,17,19] revealed a reasonable Sr and Cs (but
not Ag) retention for TRISO oxide fuel in the short term (50 – 1000 h) for low and medium
burn-up at temperatures up to 1600°C: Cs-release for medium burn-up fuel starts after about
40 – 200 h and amounts to about 1 % after 1000 h heating . Fig . 9 contains the Cs-release in
heating tests at 1600°C for TRISO fuel elements and fuel compacts of different burn-up.
Extrapolation to long heating times leads to almost complete Cs-release after about 10000 h
[19] . These results are not in conflict with interpretations of normal operation releases in this
paper, because a sufficient retention in accident tests is found only for the short term, i .e . as
long as breakthrough of the diffusion front has not yet taken place . Extrapolation of accident
tests to normal operation via diffusion coefficients in SiC revealed that at 1250°C a
comparable release to 1600°C values occurs for about 1 order of magnitude greater heating
times, which is coarsely in line with results of table III . Here we have to take into account that
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the diffusion of Cs in SiC has shows a far smaller temperature dependence at < 1600°C than
Fig . 9: Cs-release in accident heating tests of TRISO fuel (U-235/total heavy metal = 0 .10
except for AVR 70/26 with 0.17 and R2-K13/1 with 0 .09))
Looking on iodine release in core heat-up accidents by diffusion from intact coated particles
there is still some uncertainty: it is usually assumed in safety analyses that iodine release
from fuel elements happens equivalent to noble gases in normal operation and in core heat-
up accidents : This means that no diffusion through intact coated particles is taken into
account . This assumption is based on two experimental observations:
o At first a similar behaviour of iodine and noble gases in irradiation tests, where
release were detected from uncoated uranium only (defective particles and uranium
contamination of matrix graphite)
o At second on two short term heating tests (FRJ2-K14, 20 and 43 h at 1600°C) on re-
irradiated low burn-up fuel pebbles where iodine release was found to be smaller
than the fraction of uncoated uranium
In contrast to noble gas release the iodine release could not be measured in most accident
heating test because these heating tests were performed at least several months after end
of irradiation, when I-131 and I-133 were no longer present due to decay. Release
measurements of long lived Kr-85 in accident heating tests excludes significant noble gas
diffusion through intact coatings for time periods of up to 500 – 1000 h.
However, besides by an equivalent release behaviour of iodine and noble gases these
experimental observations can also be explained as follows : The observed similarity of
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iodine and noble gas release in irradiation tests may be pretended by the short halve life of
iodine nuclides examined : Their break through time may be much larger than their halve life
at these low temperature irradiation tests, but that is – depending on the activation energy of
iodine diffusion in coatings - not necessarily true for accident temperatures and prolonged
heating times (> 100 h) . Noble gases and iodine behave chemically very different and thus
their diffusion behaviour is expected to be different.
Because of the pronounced radiological relevance of iodine more reliable data of its diffusion
behaviour through coatings at accident temperatures are required in order to prove the
assumed analogy to noble gases . As long as a reliable proof of the analogy is not available
an adequate safety factor in design basis core heat-up accidents should be applied on
iodine source tems.
3.6 Comparison of HTR and LWR fission product behaviour
There are significant differences between LWR and HTR concerning fuel elements and
fission product transport behaviour : Fuel centre temperatures may reach in LWRs values of
up to 2500°C. However on the pellet surface temperatures are < 800 °C, which significantly
limits diffusive release. The second barrier in LWRs, the Zircalloy cladding is at temperatures
of 320 – 600°C only, which suppresses any diffusive release of metallic fission products via
intact claddings . Only fuel elements with defective claddings release fission products. In
contrast a diffusion of metallic fission products from intact coat fuel particles cannot be
avoided in HTR normal operation because of the higher temperatures and because of the
small thickness of the diffusion barriers . Also for that the occasionally claimed compensation
of a gas tight containment by the allegedly excellent retention of coated particles (“5 billion
containments in a pebble bed HTR”) is far too optimistic.
Another important difference involves fission product behaviour in the coolant circuit.
Because of their strong affinity to liquid water, fission products except of noble gases remain
in PWRs in the coolant by chemical interaction and physical dissolution, until they are
removed by the purification facilities . Typical values of Cs-137 are 1 – 5 GBq in the coolant of
a PWR (high burn-up) and 500 – 1000 GBq in the resins of the purification facility [36] . The
fission product concentrations in metallic components of the primary circuit remain low . This
allows an easy handling of fission products released in normal operation . In contrast the
affinity of reactive fission products to the coolant He in HTRs is small and thus these fission
products tend to plate out rapidly on primary circuit components and on graphitic dust, as
occurred in AVR [1a,5,56] . Already after passing the steam generator more about 90 % of the
molecular Cs is plated out [5,56] . The equilibrium partition coefficient between plated out Cs
and coolant borne molecular Cs is in He-cooled systems in the range of 10 6 - 108 but almost
0 in LWRs. Accordingly the removal of reactive fission products via a gas clean-up plant is
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not efficient and the fission products accumulate in a not well defined manner in the whole
HTR primary circuit during . There were examinations on a fission product filter to be installed
in the main hot gas stream of an HTR [38] . However these filters were tested in an AVR
bypass for up to 2 months and did not work successful for Cs, but indicated some limited
efficiency for Ag [41] . Decontamination of the HTR primary circuit was found to be difficult,
also because in hot parts diffusion of fission products into primary circuit components occurs.
This fission product accumulation in the primary circuit is a major unresolved disadvantage of
HTRs with respect to its safety, maintenance and dismantling/disposal . As long as this HTR
problem is not resolved, the requirements on fission product retention of fuel elements have
to be far more stringent for HTRs compared to LWRs.
4. Relevance of AVR experience for future pebble bed reactors
4.1 Maximum permissible environmental release in design basis accidents
What are the implications of temperature uncertainties for future pebble bed HTRs?
Enhanced fission product accumulation in the primary circuit during normal operation is a
major safety concern, because these activities were found by safety analyses to be main
source term contribution in design basis accidents (see [5] and literature cited there), and
may even contribute significantly to the risk.
Aggravating, future HTRs are at present not designed with a gas tight containment, as the
AVR had . In direct cycle HTRs the activity deposition on the gas turbine, which at present
cannot be sufficiently decontaminated, hinders the required hands on maintenance [6] . A gas
turbine in a secondary cycle with an intermediate heat exchanger, as discussed for the
French ANTARES block reactor project, avoids this problem . However, the efficiency drops
and additional components are required . A similar problem exists with the graphite side
reflector whose exchange after about 20 y of operation is under discussion for pebble bed
HTRs . This exchange is probably required, because graphite tends to expand even at high
temperatures if certain neutron doses are exceeded . Further on, maximum temperatures in
core heat-up accidents may be enlarged by inadmissible high normal operation
temperatures. In order to suppress graphite oxidation with formation of burnable gases in
design basis accidents, the normal operation core temperatures in steam and process heat
generating HTRs must remain limited.
Assuming a reactor with modern fuel, 400 MWth, hot gas temperatures of 900°C and core
temperature enhancements similar to AVR leads to end of life (32 y full power operation)
contaminations at least in the same order as in AVR end of life . This is estimated on basis of
the reduction factors evaluated in chapter 3 .5. Here we have to note again that AVR was
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operated for only less than 4 y at hot gas temperatures > 900°C . This means that
consequences of contaminations as in AVR have to be carefully considered.
Table IV contains release limits of individual key nuclides into the environment in case of
design basis accidents for German licensing conditions . The values given are calculated on
basis of the maximum tolerable doses (50 mSv effective and red bone mark dose, 150 mSv
thyroid dose), taking into account the obliged source term – dose calculation ordinance [42].
For a given source term there are only two site specific parameters, which influence the
doses at the fence: These are the minimum distance to the fence and the emission height . In
case of a common release of several nuclides, the individual exclusion release limits drop.
Further on, ALARA holds here and therefore the releases limits must not be reached, if that is
reasonably achievable. This table contains equilibrium core inventories of the HTR-
Module200 as a typical example for a modern design with advanced fuel, too.
Nuclide Halve life Total core inventory
HTR-Module (200 MW th )
[GBq]
Exclusion release limit [GBq]
for emission height
20 m
	
50 m
Sr-90 28.8 y 1 .37 · 107 0 .4 0.6
Ag-110m 250 d 1 .89 · 105 270 410
I-131 8 d 2 .07 · 108 5 .5 10
Xe-133 5 .3 d 4 .44 · 108 5.7 · 107 1 .1 · 108
Cs-137 30.1 y 1 .67 · 107 30 50
Tab. IV: Calculated exclusion release limits of single nuclides into the environment for
design basis accidents (derived from German regulations [42], distance to site
fence: 100 m; release duration : 8 h)
The release limits of table IV are valid for Western Europe with its high population density but
for other countries less stringent regulations may be applicable . Release limits as in table IV
were in principal applied already to the AVR operation : The maximum permitted coolant
activity, which consists almost exclusively of noble gases, was 3 .7 · 108 GBq [3], which is near
to limit for Xe-133 in table IV. However, no limits were defined for the far more radiotoxic
activity which is deposited in the coolant circuit ; this was, because it was optimistically
assumed that deposited fission products cannot be remobilized in accidents.
The Sr-90 activity accumulated in the primary circuit outside the AVR active core (fig . 2)
exceeds German release limits into the environment for design basis accidents by more than
5 orders of magnitude . On the other hand, some safety estimations for modern HTR
concepts at hot gas temperatures of 900°C (40 MW th, 10 y operation) resulted in
accumulated Sr-releases of almost 11 orders of magnitude smaller than found in AVR [29].
This discrepancy, which reflects also uncertainties in models and data used, has to be
studied and the activities accumulated in future reactors have to be carefully estimated on
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basis of AVR experience in order to avoid an underestimation of the primary circuit
contamination.
From data in table IV the maximum tolerable mobile fraction of fission products accumulated
in the primary circuit can be estimated from the point of view of protection of the public . In
case that unfiltered releases into the environment in design basis accidents have to be
assumed (i .e. no gas tight containment), a conservatively estimated mobile fraction of
accumulated activities must remain sufficiently below the evaluated exclusion release limits
of table IV. In presence of a gas tight containment with filtered release an accumulated
mobile activity by at least 2 orders of magnitude larger than exclusion limits of table IV
becomes tolerable.
In presence of a gas tight containment other limiting factors may become effective, as there
are the above discussed requirements of maintenance and of dismantling : In order to allow
hand on maintenance of a direct cycle gas turbine, the total accumulated release of Cs-137
in the primary circuit should not exceed about 500 - 1000 GBq for Cs-137 or 120 – 150 GBq
for Ag-110 [6], as long as an efficient decontamination of the turbine cannot be performed.
Restrictive limits are expected also for a complete exchange of the side reflector.
Metallic fission products occur mainly dust borne in the coolant circuit of pebble bed reactors
[5,56] . The dust is deposited by gravitation in dead water regions or by adhesive forces on
surfaces. The mobilization of deposited activity in pebble bed reactors in course of accidents
is not well examined, but some effort is at present spent into that item . There are however
data on activity mobilization of specimen from Peach Bottom HTGR . These specimen were
similar to AVR and THTR covered with a carbonaceous layer and contained more than 80 %
of Cs and Sr released into the coolant circuit of the Peach Bottom HTGR. Blow down tests
revealed that at shear forces by a factor of 5 larger than in normal operation between 2 and
25 % of the deposited activity is released within 2 minutes [43] . Later tests on specimen
without a carbonaceous layer did not show a mobilization of deposited metallic fission
products, but a small release of iodine . For conservative estimations as required in design
basis accidents a mobilization degree of 25 % is assumed for depressurization accidents of
pebble bed reactors . Japanese estimates result in a release of 15 % of Cs and 40 % of the
iodine deposited in the coolant circuit [52] . Formation of carbon dust cannot yet be avoided in
current pebble bed reactors but in HTRs with block type fuel.
The following table V contains maximum tolerable accumulated activities and core release
rates (40 y operation) for cases with and without presence of a gas tight containment . ALARA
has to be taken into account : Because releases of LWRs remain in design basis accidents far
below the limits of table IV, the exclusion release limits of table IV are divided for calculations
of the values in table V by a factor of 5 . Similar data were generated by Flowers already 1973
[47], but for a large size block type HTR (3000MW th) with about 500 m distance to the fence:
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Flowers calculated a maximum tolerable Sr-release fraction of 10 -7 into the environment 1
(public protection) and a maximum tolerable release fraction of Cs-137 into the coolant circuit
of 6 · 10 -6 (maintenance criterion). This agrees reasonably with values of table V, having also
in mind that current dose factors are larger than those used by Flowers and that the distance
to the fence is different.
Typical calculated design values for accumulated primary circuit contaminations of advanced
modular HTRs (200 - 400 MWth) are in the range of 2000 to 20000 GBq Cs-137, depending
on hot gas temperatures. Enhanced temperatures as observed in AVR were not yet taken
into account . Sr-90-values are calculated to about 2 - 3 orders of magnitude smaller. It
becomes obvious that systems without gas tight containment exceed limits for protection of
the public by far, even if no temperature uncertainties are considered . For presence of a gas
tight containment the limits for protection of the public are met . Deposition of fission products
in the containment before the filtered release starts may additionally increase the maximum
tolerable activities/releases; accordingly, lower limits are given in table V . However criteria
derived from maintenance of a gas turbine, which do not depend on the presence of a gas
tight containment, are not met . Nevertheless, a gas-tight containment is required also in
future systems, but has to be complemented by other measures, as discussed below.
Nuclide/criterion No containment Gas tight containment
Max. tolerable
accumulated
activity [GBq]
Max. tolerable
release rate
from core [Bq/s]
Max. tolerable
accumulated
activity [GBq]
Max. tolerable
release rate
from core [Bq/s]
Sr-90/
public protection
0 .4 0 .5 > 200 > 250
Cs-137/
public protection
40 50 > 20000 > 25000
Cs-137/
maintenance
1000 1200 1000 1200
Table V :
	
Maximum tolerable accumulated activities in the primary circuit of future HTRs
and corresponding maximum tolerable core release rates for cases with and
without a gas tight containment . Criteria are protection of the public (see table
IV) and requirements of maintenance and disposal.
Considering enhanced temperatures as observed in AVR the following results are obtained:
Upscaling of AVR core release rates for Cs-137 as measured in the final AVR operation
period 1987-88 in VAMPYR-II [56] to 400 MW th leads to values of > 35000 [Bq/s] at 700°C
hot gas temperature and > 300000 [Bq/s] at 930°C hot gas temperature . These AVR release
rates may have been enhanced by presence of fuel, not representing the best achieved
1 Flowers assumes for block type HTRs a release in accidents of 10 -5 of the coolant circuit contamination . With
that he calculates a maximum tolerable release fraction of Sr into the coolant circuit of 10 -2 .
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quality. For the final AVR operation period thus a reduction factor of 2 to 3 may be applied to
measured rates, as long as best estimate values are required . On the other hand in a direct
comparison of measured AVR release rates with conservative design values as here, which
contain some safety factors, a reduction factor is not adequate.
Sr-90 with its distinctive radiotoxicity shows a more pronounced temperature dependence of
release rates than Cs . Thus Sr-90 becomes a major problem when high hot gas
temperatures are required and inadmissible high core temperatures as in AVR cannot be
excluded: For core temperatures > 1300°C Sr-release rates have to be considered as
conservative design values, which exceed the even lower limits of table V for the case of a
gas tight containment . Altogether, the core temperature uncertainties significantly aggravate
existing safety problems.
As long as pebble bed immanent reasons for inadmissible high core temperatures cannot be
excluded the following strategies are possible in order to guarantee a safe operation of future
pebble bed HTRs : On the one hand side a reduction of demands e.g . reduction of average
hot gas temperatures and of average fuel burn-up . On the other hand, major R&D effort may
be spent in order to overcome the existing problems . The latter will be discussed in chapter
5 . These strategies complement a gas tight containment . Summing up this means that safe
operation of pebble bed reactors can currently not yet be guaranteed at hot gas
temperatures suitable for driving of chemical processes like hydrogen generation or coal
gasification (950-1000°C).
The last German pebble bed HTR project, the HTR-Module200 (1988), was designed for
average hot gas temperatures of 700°C, for an U-235 content of 0 .55 g/fuel element, for a
maximum fuel burn-up of 9 % fima (8 % enriched uranium) and for an average power density
of 3 MW/m³. Only for these less challenging conditions the maturity for licensing and
construction was seen . However pronounced temperature deviations as observed in AVR
were not taken into account . A gas tight containment was not foreseen, because fast
depressurizations were excluded in the design philosophy by qualification of large diameter
ducts as “vessels”, whose failure has not to be assumed in the range of design basis
accidents . The latter assumption was meanwhile found to be too optimistic, i .e . fast
depressurizations can no longer be omitted as design basis accidents and thus the need for
a gas tight containment also for this concept became obvious . Nevertheless, compared to
concepts oriented on high-temperature process heat generation the HTR-Module200 with its
limited hot gas temperatures, as concepts based on the HTR-Module200 seem to be more
realistic, although even here major effort is required before of construction.
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4.2 Consequences of AVR experience for water ingress accidents
Another major safety relevant implication of inadmissible high core temperatures lies in the
fact that the formation rate of burnable gases in design basis water ingress accidents
increases exponentially with temperature : A mixture of CO and H 2 is formed by interaction
between steam and graphite . This problem occurs in steam cycle and in process heat
generating concepts without an intermediate heat exchanger, but not in present direct cycle
ones. A primary circuit depressurization is hardly avoidable in this accident sequence . In
order to prevent explosive gas mixtures after depressurization, maximum graphite surface
temperatures must not exceed 1100 - 1200°C [2,4], depending on the core temperature
distribution . This corresponds to maximum tolerable hot gas temperatures of < 750°C, if
maximum core temperatures of 250 K higher than calculated with standard methods and as
occurring in AVR are assumed . The presence of burnable graphite dust in pebble bed
reactors may worsen the situation [5,56] . An enlarged fission product release into the primary
circuit followed by water ingress, remobilization of the accumulated activity, depressurization
and destruction of last barriers by a gas explosion cannot be accepted as a potential
scenario for a design basis accident . Moreover, such accidents are expected to proceed fast,
i .e. within of 10 – 20 min [2,4] . Accordingly, emergency measures become difficult to perform.
The prevention of these accidents may require major design changes as reduction of
temperatures or an explosion proven or inertized containment.
Hot gas streams as observed in AVR may lead to overheating of parts of the steam generator
or of other metallic components which may increase their failure rate . It remains to be
examined, whether the slow AVR water ingress of 1978 was caused by such hot gas
streams : Temperatures in gas streams below the steam generator of up to 1100°C were
measured in 1985 [40] but long term stability of AVR metal components was limited to about
850°C. A sufficient cool down of hot gas streams e .g. by mixing with bypass flows, as
originally assumed in AVR design, did not occur.
Another lesson to be learned from AVR water ingress of 1978 belongs to reactivity effects : By
human error, the water ingress was not taken sufficiently serious and the reactor was
operated at low power for several days in order to dry the primary circuit [3] . The blowers
touched the level of liquid water accumulated at the vessel bottom and mixed water droplets
to the coolant . In a later stage, when blowers were stopped but the reactor was still in
operation, liquid water run out of the steam generator leak into the core . As exhibited later, a
fraction of about 3 % of liquid water in the void volume of a pebble bed may lead to a positive
void coefficient of reactivity [28,55] . These conditions were however not reached in the AVR
water ingress accident . In order to exclude such potential reactivity problems future concepts
must not foresee steam generators on top of the core.
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4.3 Consequences of AVR experience for core heat-up accidents
The influence of inadmissible high core temperatures in normal operation on core heat-up
accidents depends on the temperature distribution : Hot spots are evened out during core
heat-up, but larger regions of high temperatures may increase the maximum accident
temperature beyond tolerable values. A gas tight containment is expected to solve this
problem. An active emergency cooling safety system, not yet foreseen in future reactors, is
required additionally, if high fuel burn-up is intended or core temperatures in core heat-up
accidents > 1800°C have to be considered.
5. Conclusion
The following major problems of pebble bed HTRs were identified during a re-evaluation of
the safety behaviour of the AVR operation:
- Inadmissible high core temperatures, which heavily accelerated the activity release
from fuel elements into the coolant circuit, and whose reasons are not yet understood
- An insufficient retention capability of present TRISO fuel elements for metallic fission
products particularly in high temperature, long term normal operation as required for
process heat applications.
- Safety, maintenance and disintegration problems due to the uncontrolled
accumulation of metallic fission products all over the primary circuit . Fission products
are present in the circuit to a large part in a mobile form.
Major effort is needed in order to resolve the above listed open safety problems . In any case,
a gas tight containment, as included in almost all other modern reactor systems, has to be
foreseen for future HTRs. The containment should be explosion proven or inertized in order
to prevent from potential dust or burnable gas explosions in accidents . However, a gas tight
containment will not sufficiently eliminate all problems listed: Thus pebble bed HTRs require
additional safety related R&D effort and updating of safety analyses before of construction.
This includes a careful examination of AVR and THTR experience . In detail the following
tasks remain to be examined . This list takes also the results of the NRC evaluation of pebble
bed reactors into account [9,39,52]:
- Development and testing of a new fuel element sufficiently retaining metallic fission
products Ag and Cs in long term normal operation . For HTR application in process
heat generation or for high burn-up fuel an improvement of retention of non metallic
fission products and of Sr is required, too . The need for a new fuel element for
process heat applications is seen elsewhere too [48] . Screening tests of alternative
coatings revealed for ZrC a better Cs retention, which is however accompanied by a
worse retention for Ru and Pd, and by a smaller oxidation stability [48] . Accordingly
straightforward solutions for a sufficiently retaining fuel element are not yet available.
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Combined ZrC/SiC coatings are discussed in [48] . The complete development and
testing of a new HTR fuel element may require at least as much as 10 years of
intense R&D.
- Development of a reliable method for quality control of fuel elements . At present,
there is no straightforward quality control method for fabricated fuel pebbles available,
except of long term irradiation of representative fuel elements of a production charge
at normal operation temperatures with subsequent heat up test, which is however too
expensive . The quality control method has to cover requirements of normal operation
and of design basis accidents.
- Experiments on iodine release from irradiated fuel elements under temperatures of
core heat-up accidents. As outlined in chapter 3 .6 this is required as proof of the
assumed analogy between release behaviour of noble gases and of iodine.
- Full understanding and reliable modelling of the core temperature behaviour, of
related temperature problems observed in AVR (power asymmetry, hot gas currents)
and of pebble bed mechanics including pebble rupture particularly at extended core
heights
- Development of a fast and reliable local measurement method (direct or indirect) of
safety relevant parameters in the pebble bed core (e .g . temperatures) . Looking on the
diverse potential reasons for inadmissible high temperatures in pebble bed reactors,
a fast temperature measurement system for the pebble bed is essential . Because of
the continuous movement of pebble beds with potential change of configurations
those temperature measurements are more important than in conventional static
reactors . This is however not only relevant for normal operation but also for the core
heat-up event : The progress of this design basis accident cannot be reasonably
monitored without knowledge about temperatures in the active core. Because of a
temperature drop in pebble beds near to walls, which is caused by elevated porosities
inducing higher flow rates, measurements in reflectors are not sufficient : This teaches
also experience with thermocouples in AVR reflector noses (see fig . 1c), which did not
detect unexpected high temperatures.
- Full understanding of fission product transport behaviour in the primary circuit (e .g.
abrasive graphite dust formation and mobilization, including dust interaction with
fission products) . This includes measures to avoid the current uncontrollable activity
accumulation in the circuit over the whole operation time
- Development of a fast detection system for metallic fission product release from core:
This system has to be installed at the core exit and should in contrast to former
systems not require a reactor shut down for removal of the plate out section.
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- Development of high temperature materials for process heat specific components of
HTRs . Respective generic work has already been started . For HTR application a long
term high-temperature stability in an irradiation environment is required, which is
difficult to achieve with Ni-containing alloys . Further on formation of Co-60, which is
distributed over the whole coolant circuit, was observed in AVR and THTR, which
hinders maintenance work . For that Co-alloys have to be avoided, too.
- Studies on HTR specific dismantling and disposal items: Due to the large volume of
the HTR core containing mainly gas cooled reactor specific waste major challenges
on disposal occur. Also from other graphite moderated reactors about 2 .5 · 108 kg of
irradiated graphite exist worldwide, which cannot yet be disposed . This graphite
contains besides of fission products remarkable activities of long lived C-14, whose
efficient separation from the graphite is not yet possible . It has to be discussed,
whether the construction of future graphite moderated reactors is responsible, as long
as the graphite specific disposal problems are not resolved . R&D to this HTR disposal
problem has been initiated.
Other open problems of pebble bed reactors are discussed in [5,9,39,52,56] . Before initiation
of the above listed comprehensive R&D a feasibility study including an estimate of the
required R&D effort is advisable in order to quantify the economical risk of this development.
A representative experimental reactor, which is sufficiently equipped with instruments also for
in-core measurements, is required for a reliable examination of the open questions . A large
number of the open problems cannot be sufficiently studied in out-of pile experiments . This
experimental reactor should also allow for detection of the flow pattern of individual pebbles,
as of variation of local bed porosities and of dust formation rates . In addition the
improvement of the nuclear, thermohydraulic, pebble bed mechanics and fission product
release model used in design and licensing of the pebble bed HTR is necessary in order to
meet the current international standards. Such model improvements were meanwhile started
at PBMR in South Africa.
Concerning beyond design basis accidents there are still unresolved questions connected to
a massive air ingress with graphite burning, which may lead to massive fission product
releases from the reactor [45,52] . Such an air ingress accident was selected as basis for the
emergency planning of the AVR. However, priority has to be given to the solution of problems
related to safety problems of normal operation and of design basis accidents.
With respect to future very high temperature reactor (VHTR)-concepts as discussed in
Generation IV it is advisable to perform a comparative study of pebble bed reactors with
block type fuel HTRs, which do not show most of the problems discussed before . More
general a comparative probabilistic safety assessment considering Generation III LWRs and
pebble bed reactors is required : Development of Generation III LWRs led to major safety
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improvements. In contrast the improved knowledge to safety of pebble bed HTRs since 1990
leads to the conclusion that former comprehensive safety assessments were too optimistic:
As outlined above there exist unresolved safety problems in pebble bed reactors for design
basis accidents, as for beyond design basis accidents like severe air ingress with graphite
burning . Previously a superior safety behaviour of pebble bed reactors was claimed
compared to other nuclear systems including an allegedly catastrophe free design . According
to the above presents arguments there are doubts, whether this depicts reality.
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